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Chapter 1 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS 
AND THEMES 
THE REORGANIZATION of agricultural production units into large-scale 
state and collective farms has been the most radical change of economic 
institutions implemented by Marxist governments. In contrast to the na-
tionalization of industry and the replacement of the market by central 
planning and administration, this institutional change has transformed 
not only ownership and the way in which production units have func-
tioned, but also the way in which laborers have gone about their work 
and have related to each other. The forced collectivization of agriculture 
has also been a searing historical experience in Marxist regimes, during 
which tens of millions died from starvation and mistreatment, while 
countless others suffered greatly as a result of the coercion.1 
History has not unfolded as nineteenth-century Marxists expected. So-
cialist revolutions arising from domestic political forces have not occurred 
first in industrialized nations, but rather, for the most part, in predomi-
nantly agricultural countries with relatively low levels of economic de-
velopment. Furthermore, despite commonplace notions about "peasant 
conservatism" and the difficulty in reorganizing and reforming agricul-
tural production, Marxist regimes have paid particular attention to trans-
forming the institutions of the rural sector, even while agriculture was 
the largest sector in the economy and when such changes were most dif-
ficult to implement. Furthermore, this institutional change occurred in 
many countries without extensive agricultural mechanization or high Iev-
1 Estimates of deaths in the Soviet Union resulting directly or indirectly from collectivi-
zation range from 11 million upward. For instance, according to the careful estimations of 
Robert Conquest (1986), elimination of the rich farmers (kulaks) was a crucial part of the 
collectivization drive in the Soviet Union and resulted in the deaths of 6.5 million. Another 
8 million died in famines in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan that were an integral part of the 
program. In China, estimates of deaths from land reform and collectivization from 1946 
through 1957 range from 250,000 to 5 million or more; Moise (1983, p. 142) estimates be-
tween 1 and 1.5 million for the land reform, although later evidence suggests this may be 
high. The real violence came in the period 1958-61 when the government attempted to 
consolidate the collective farms into communes and precipitated a famine, when, according 
to the estimates of Banister (1987, p. 85), 30 million died. In most other Marxist regimes 
land reforms and collectivization were not so violent, although as discussed in chapter 4, 
the governments employed considerable coercion. 
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6 CHAPTER 1 
els of rural education and where administration of large-scale agriculture 
was probably neither cost effective nor necessary. In Marxist terminol-
ogy, the relations of production were probably too advanced in compari-
son to the forces of production. Finally, although Marx emphasized the 
relatively similar paths of development of industry and agriculture and 
laid great moral stress on the value of all types of physical labor, most of 
these Marxist governments have organized the two sectors in dissimilar 
ways and have treated urban and rural workers quite differently, often to 
the disadvantage of the latter. 
Contemporary Marxists, particularly those influenced by the ideas of 
Stalin, have ready explanations for each of these apparent deviations from 
classical Marxist doctrines. But in analyzing such issues, Marxists of any 
stripe have greater difficulty in answering a more basic question: What is 
the best way for a government professing to follow the ideas of Marx and 
Lenin to organize agriculture so as to enhance the economic develop-
ment of an entire nation? Although Marxist-Leninist doctrines about the 
organization of agriculture may leave much to be desired, discussion in 
the West about the optimal organization of agriculture is certainly not 
much more advanced. Enormous attention has been focused on "saving 
the family farm," but many more organizational issues need to be dis-
cussed. Indeed, relatively little data are available to study many critical 
problems—for example, the horizontal linkages between farms or vertical 
linkages between farms and either upstream or downstream enterprises 
in the chain of production. In contrast to the analysis of the organization 
of industry, no formal academic field studying the organization of agri-
culture exists; no scholarly journals devoted to the topic fill the shelves 
of libraries; and no standard analytic methods are available to resolve dis-
putes on policy questions. 
First and foremost, this is a study about the organization of Marxist 
economies, both in theory and practice. I have chosen agriculture be-
cause it allows a series of analytic issues to be examined in an easier fash-
ion than other sectors would allow. This book is an examination of ideas 
and their influence, and how, given the heterogeneity of agriculture, 
these ideas can be stretched to their furthest limits. But this is also an 
empirical investigation of the origins, organization, and development of 
agriculture in thirty-three identified Marxist regimes shown on the maps 
here. In order to provide some perspective, I also investigate certain as-
pects of the organization of agriculture in market economies, both to test 
various Marxist propositions about the development of agriculture and to 
illuminate the differences and similarities of agricultural organization in 
various economic systems. 
Finally, this book is an attempt to synthesize a vast and straggly schol-
arly literature in both East and West on a number of theoretical and em-
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pirical issues about agricultural organization. In order to keep the discus-
sion manageable, many issues cannot be discussed in depth and the 
reader is referred to the appropriate references for further analysis. I 
must also leave to others the task of carrying out detailed case studies to 
advance our knowledge of agriculture in individual countries. Neverthe-
less, I hope that the analytical framework and the comparative perspec-
tive provided herein enriches the case-study approach by allowing a sep-
aration of key causal factors. For instance, which aspects of agricultural 
organization and policy can be attributed to Marxist-Leninist doctrines? 
Or to the type of agriculture practiced in various countries? Or to the 
particular historical circumstances of the different nations? Or to the de-
cisions arising from the unique political mechanisms of particular 
nations? I also try to show why, despite the deficiencies in performance 
of collectivized agriculture, it is highly doubtful that state and collective 
farms will disappear quickly, even in some nations where Marxist parties 
have been voted out of power. 
But first it is necessary to delimit the topic, especially by defining two 
crucial terms, socialist agriculture and Marxist regimes, so that the sub-
ject matter and the sample can be specified. Then I briefly summarize 
the role of agriculture in the sample countries in order to provide an 
overview of the economic context within which agriculture is organized. 
Finally, I indicate briefly the major questions investigated and the path 
along which they are approached. 
SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE 
For purposes of this study I define socialist agriculture in terms of insti-
tutions of production rather than particular types of governmental inter-
vention. Collectivization is the process including nationalization or ex-
propriation of private farms and the creation of large-scale cooperative 
and state farms. For most of recorded history, governments have inter-
ceded in the agricultural sector in order to reinforce or suppress market 
forces and channels of distribution, to encourage production, or to influ-
ence rural incomes. For this reason governmental intervention per se 
provides little indication about the economic system of agriculture. The 
definition of socialist agriculture as represented by institutions of produc-
tion gives rise, however, to a number of complications. 
General Considerations 
Marx and Engels told us little about institutions of agricultural produc-
tion functioning in socialist economies. They made only scattered com-
ments from which emerges a murky picture of what agriculture would be 
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8 CHAPTER 1 
like when full communism arrives.2 They foresaw an economy of high 
productivity and disciplined workers, but with no markets or money, so 
that exchange of products between urban and rural areas would, in some 
manner, be "direct." Such an arrangement would be facilitated by the 
fact that the ideas and outlooks of those living in the two areas would be 
similar. 
Up to now, Kampuchea between 1975 and 1978 has been the only 
Marxist nation to attempt to realize such a communist agricultural sys-
tem. The Pol Pot regime expropriated all land, formed relatively large-
scale, self-sufficient production units, and effectively eliminated both 
trade and money. Party or government cadre—often soldiers in their 
teens—directed the labor force, providing workers with agricultural in-
puts received from the central government, and distributing food rations, 
housing, and clothing according to norms unrelated to an individual's 
work. Food was also communally consumed. The farms, in turn, supplied 
the central government with deliveries of particular goods.3 The scholarly 
community has focused little attention on this unique attempt to realize 
Marx's vision, in part because the mass murders accompanying this Kam-
puchean transformation have been more important to study, and in part 
because high productivity, a crucial aspect of full communism, was not 
achieved in this nation. 
More usual production institutions of socialist agriculture are state 
farms, collective farms, and communes, all of which are forms of large-
scale agriculture. It is, of course, possible to have a socialized urban sec-
tor without a socialist agricultural sector, a situation arising in Poland and 
Yugoslavia from the mid-1950s to the present, as well as in a number of 
Marxist African nations. It is also possible to conceive of a socialist agri-
cultural sector that produces a plantation crop exhibiting economies of 
scale, combined with a predominantly private urban sector that provides 
complementary products and services. This latter system does not appear 
to be stable in the long run and is not exemplified in any of the nations 
of the sample.4 Socialist agricultural institutions are usually accompanied 
2 This discussion is based on Pryor (1985b), which provides all of the relevant quotations. 
3 A highly detailed eyewitness account of life on one of these units is provided by May 
(1986), and other interesting views are presented in Kiernan and Boua (1982 chap. 10). 
Most journalists and scholars have focused their attention on such notable aspects of this 
system as the extreme cruelty of the government and the division of the population into 
different classes so that each received different amounts of food and other rations, rather 
than on more mundane aspects of how the economy worked. By far the most systematic 
examination of the economic system is by Twining (1989), although many gaps in his study 
remain due to lack of reliable information. 
4 It has been most closely approximated in Sao Tome and Seychelles. Before indepen-
dence, both were predominantly plantation economies in which the plantations were pri-
marily owned by foreigners (especially in the former). Sao Tome immediately nationalized 
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by certain other features that are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
system to function, for instance, rules against firing workers on state 
farms or removing members from collective farms. 
It is important to emphasize that communal agricultural systems found 
in some developing nations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, have little 
in common with socialist agriculture. In the former systems, the com-
munity can place restrictions on what a farmer can do with the land, on 
the date when certain agricultural activities can begin or end, and even 
on the farming techniques that are employed. In some cases land is also 
distributed by traditional political leaders, but nevertheless, families 
farm the land individually and individual wealth is not merged. Of 
course, cooperative work efforts occur and may be of considerable signif-
icance, but they are both informal and voluntary; these arrangements in-
clude trading labor or participating in work gangs that spend a certain 
amount of time on the farms of each member (Pryor 1977). In contrast to 
the beliefs of African political leaders such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania 
or Leopold Senghor of Senegal, experience in Africa has shown that com-
munal agriculture has little in common with collectivized farming and, 
indeed, these systems do not lead easily to socialist agriculture. 
State Farms 
A state farm is simply a factory-in-the-field that is owned by the govern-
ment. In most cases the government or a government board appoints a 
director, who hires workers and manages the farm in the same manner 
as the hired manager of a capitalist plantation. Although the workers may 
receive bonuses based on production, their primary source of income is 
a wage, and the government thus absorbs most risks of production. 
Some cases are, however, hard to classify. For instance, in Yugoslavia 
the public sector has certain residual rights in the nonprivate farms (for 
example, the members cannot sell the assets and pocket the receipts), so 
that these enterprises might be considered state farms. Nevertheless, 
these "socially owned" farms operate essentially as producer cooperatives 
and are run by worker councils, which set the basic policy guidelines and 
hire the farm managers. Thus these farms combine features of both sys-
tems. In other East European nations, as I will indicate, the difference 
between state and collective farms has eroded. 
State farms can be formal production units ultimately administered by 
a central authority such as a ministry of agriculture. Other types of state 
farms, sometimes called "institutional farms," include those farms at-
these estates and Seychelles began a slow but relentless nationalization drive. Both nations, 
however, also began to create government-owned enterprises in the urban sector. 
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tached to state-owned industrial plants such as the podkhozi in the 
USSR, farms operated by special development agencies (for instance, in 
Seychelles), farms operated by the army, local governments, primary 
schools, or universities (for example, experimental stations) or farms op-
erated by the Marxist party (for instance, in the Congo). In most of the 
countries these institutional farms hold only a small percentage of the 
land in the state farm sector; a notable exception is Benin, however, 
where they constitute 95 percent of the state farm sector.5 In other coun-
tries, these institutional farms, although relatively small in total area, in-
creased in importance. Most notably, during the 1980s the govern-
ment of the Soviet Union encouraged factories to administer farms in 
order to supply food for factory canteens. As Hedlund has emphasized 
(1989), these attempts to increase total farm output often divert special-
ized managerial resources in industry from where they can best be em-
ployed. 
According to Stalinist dogma, the state farm is a "higher form of social-
ism" than the collective farm, and until the late 1980s some Marxist re-
gimes such as Albania, Mongolia, Romania, and the USSR were slowly 
converting their collective farms to state farms. By no means is this 
dogma universally accepted: during the mid- and late-1980s Nicaragua 
converted a number of its original state farms into cooperatives (or even 
divided them up into private farms). The government of Seychelles has 
also announced its intention to transform its state farms into cooperatives 
once the state farms are operating on a profitable basis; this does not, 
however, seem likely to occur in the near future. 
State farms are, of course, not unique to socialism, and they also exist 
in almost all capitalist nations, serving either as experimental farms or in 
some cases a source of revenue when they are leased out to private farm-
ers. These farms represent either remnants of the original "crown land," 
or of past land reforms, or of deliberate attempts by the government to 
set up a limited number of government farms. Indeed, some instances 
can also be cited in which nominally capitalist nations such as Malawi 
have more extensive and more successful state farm systems than nomi-
nally Marxist regimes such as Madagascar (Pryor 1990c). 
Collective Farms 
I use the term collective farm to designate a farm where production is 
carried out jointly (a group of people work together under a single man-
5 According to the data from SEV (annual, 1988), in the mid-1980s such institutional 
farms amounted to about 16 percent of total farm land in Romania, 9 percent in Czecho-
slovakia, and less than 6 percent in the other Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) nations. Hedlund (1989) has an illuminating analysis of the podhozy in the USSR, 
while Despris and Khischuk (1990) explore those operated by the military. The Benin 
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agement) and where the net receipts or income of the farm (receipts after 
taxes have been paid and agricultural inputs have been purchased) are 
divided among the members according to a formula that takes into partial 
account the amount of work the members contributed to the common 
effort. The government contract with the farm usually has two parts: a 
fixed rent (that is, compulsory deliveries of certain crops at a specified 
price) and an agreement to buy all produce above this limit, usually at a 
higher price. The collective farm members bear all risks of production 
shortfalls. In some cases the government has modified this residual-in-
come principle by providing a floor income for members of the coopera-
tive; in these cases the farms receive a government subsidy or loan if net 
receipts are not sufficient to cover expenses and payments to members. 
In some countries (e.g., Cuba, Hungary, and Bulgaria until 1959) these 
farms paid rent to the farmers who brought land into the collective; in 
other countries no compensation was paid. In some countries the land 
belonged to the collective as a whole; in other countries, to the govern-
ment (a matter discussed in greater detail in chapter 3); and in still other 
countries (e.g., most of the nations of East Europe) to the people who 
brought the land into the collective, or their heirs. In some countries 
(e.g., Yugoslavia and, to a lesser degree, Bulgaria and Cuba in the late 
1980s) the farms had certain elements of self-management with elected 
representatives on the administrative council of the farm; in other coun-
tries, the farm was administered in a highly centralized fashion. 
As Adam Fforde (1989, p. xii) warns us: "Knowledge of formal, or le-
gally constituted, social structures does not necessarily tell us much 
about underlying 'reality.' " For purposes of discussion in the following 
chapters, it is useful to keep in mind that collective farms can operate in 
quite different ways, even with the same formal rules: 
1. In a cooperative farm the members appoint their own managers and 
make their own decisions. They are voluntary organizations, and, in their 
occasional appearance in several Marxist regimes, they have often had 
quite different members from year to year (e.g., in Laos, as shown by 
Evans 1990, chap. 4). Such a producer cooperative must be distinguished 
from a service cooperative, in which a group of people band together to 
market their crop, buy agricultural inputs, rent a combine, hire a tech-
nician, or participate together in some project perhaps related to farming 
but not directiy involved in all phases of the productive process. Both of 
case, discussed briefly by Codin (1986, pp. 201-3), has arisen because foreign plantations 
were minuscule (less than three thousand hectares in the 1930s) so that the government did 
not find much land to nationalize easily. Most of the institutional farms in Benin (64 percent 
of the area) were plots of towns and schools which, relying on unpaid labor, produced a 
crop whose sales yielded funds to finance investment in infrastructure. Such farms, of 
course, acted to convert a tax-in-kind to money revenues. The other farms were usually 
vertically integrated agricultural processing enterprises owned by the state. 
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these, of course, are also different from a consumer cooperative, in which 
consumers unite to purchase in bulk in order to reduce the retail margin 
they otherwise would pay. Although simple, these distinctions are often 
blurred and, as a result, have given rise to enormous confusion; for in-
stance, the varied interpretations of Lenin's last pronouncement on co-
operatives (see chapter 2). A producer cooperative must also be distin-
guished from various forms of mutual aid or cooperative arrangements 
among farmers who, however, farm their lands individually. 
2. In a pseudo-cooperative farm the unit has few cooperative elements 
and is really managed as a state farm. One type of pseudo-cooperative 
farm existed in the USSR for many decades: the state and party ap-
pointed the farm directors and expected them to meet production and 
other goals determined by the government. The directors, in turn, man-
aged the farm in an hierarchical fashion; members had almost no influ-
ence over who led them, how they were led, or what work they carried 
out. These pseudo-cooperative farms had for several decades a second-
class status: they received no state subsidies; they always had a lower 
priority in obtaining scarce agricultural inputs; they could not own their 
own machines but had to rent machine services from the Machine Trac-
tor Station (MTS); their older members received no social insurance pay-
ments from the government; and the members had to absorb the agri-
cultural risks by receiving a share of the net income, rather than a fixed 
wage. A strange type of pseudo-cooperative farm occurred in Benin in 
the 1970s and 1980s where farmers in a particular area were forced to 
combine their land and rent it to a cooperative (a p4rimdtre or coopara-
tive d'amSnagement rural) which, in turn, was managed by a team from 
a state company. Both the landlords and the landless in the area also had 
the option of working for the cooperative and receiving a wage.6 Still 
other variants of pseudo-cooperatives could be found in other countries. 
Pseudo-cooperatives were most often found in nations where the party 
and/or government was highly organized in rural areas; for example, 
many East European nations and China. 
3. In a nominal-cooperative farm the collective unit can serve either as 
a mask of the operations for a private company or of agriculturalists ac-
tually farming their land individually. One interesting example of the for-
mer has occurred in Guyana (Standing and Szal 1979, pp. 72-73; Thomas 
1983) where groups of private individuals, such as urban civil servants, 
organized cooperatives. They obtained free land, low-interest credit, and 
tax privileges and then farmed the land individually, hiring outside labor 
for the actual farm work. Other Guyanese cooperatives had "dormant 
6 This type of pseudocooperative began under a previous non-Marxist government. 
Mondjannagni (1977) and Godin (1986) provide further details. 
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members" with formal voting rights that allow a private firm to call itself 
a cooperative. A different type of nominal-cooperative farm existed in 
Viet Nam during the 1970s where the collective farm often served as a 
mask for individuals or hamlets to carry out their individual agricultural 
activities with a minimum of outside interference.7 In the highlands of 
Georgia in the Soviet Union, the collective farms also appeared to play a 
strategic role in the private economy of its members and, as such, were 
different from collectives in the Russian Republic.8 In different forms 
nominal-collectives also arose in still other countries such as Cape Verde 
(or the "pre-cooperatives" in the Congo), where the size of the collective 
fields has been relatively small in comparison to the private fields on the 
same farm. In Laos, collective farms were so loosely organized that for 
many years farmers could pull their land out of the cooperative relatively 
easily (Evans 1990). The Somali "range cooperatives" represented a nom-
inal-cooperative in a herding context: cattle were held privately and 
pieces of range land were assigned to individual families who, in some 
manner, were supposed to cooperate with each other and to obey the 
grazing rules set forth by the government. Sometimes political authori-
ties foster nominal-cooperatives as the first step toward full cooperativi-
zation; in other cases nominal-cooperatives arise where party discipline 
is weak in the rural areas, a situation occurring in most Third World 
Marxist regimes. Nominal cooperatives are most likely to be found where 
the state and party are weakly organized in the rural areas; for instance, 
Africa, Yemen, and southeast Asian nations such as Laos and Viet Nam. 
Collective farms are not the exclusive property of Marxist regimes and 
they have been sponsored in some form by non-Marxist governments as 
well. For instance, in the 1980s they existed on a large scale in Algeria, 
Israel, and Tanzania and, on a lesser scale, in other nations such as 
Ghana. Still other non-Marxist regimes feature small-scale cooperative 
farms, either in the form of small groups of people voluntarily banding 
together to farm jointly or in the form of small-scale experiments under 
7 According to Fforde (1989, pp. 6, 80), up to 75 percent of the collective farms in North 
Viet Nam were nominal in the late 1970s. His definition of nominal is somewhat looser than 
mine, since he includes farms in which the key decision-making unit is the brigade or ham-
let and, although some production is collective, some important economic activities such as 
pig raising were carried out privately. 
8 Dragadze's village study (1988) suggests that a major function of the collective farm has 
been to supply foodstuffs to members that they could not obtain in stores and that the farm 
was organized in a sufficiently loose fashion so that one family member often substituted for 
the formal member in order to accumulate family work points for the distribution of agri-
cultural products not delivered to the state. Moskoff (1984, p. 159) presents data showing 
that collective farm workers in Georgia worked on the farm many fewer days than those in 
the Russian Republic. 
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governmental aegis; an example of this occurred in the United States in 
the late 1930s.» 
Communes 
The term commune has widely different meanings, but in this study I use 
the word to describe a large-scale farm unit that has governmental pow-
ers as well; that is, the same authorities carry out both economic and 
political functions.10 These units of production could be found in China 
from the late 1950s to the early 1980s, Mongolia from the late 1950s 
through the late 1980s, Kampuchea under Pol Pot, or to a much lesser 
extent, Ethiopia in the late 1970s (in those cases where some Peasant 
Associations formed cooperatives). I omit from consideration those situ-
ations where economic and political power structures are fused in an in-
formal manner. Most often these large-scale communes operate accord-
ing to the cooperative principle in the division of the income, although 
in some cases the salary system appears to be used. 
In many cases it is difficult to decide whether a particular production 
unit is a cooperative or part of a commune in which government author-
ities at a local level play a critical role in the management of the unit. For 
instance, in North Korea after 1961, the County (Kun) Agricultural Man-
agement Committee received extensive powers to participate in farm de-
cision-making, although the cooperatives still retained their formal iden-
tity. u If this means that the county governments are the predominant 
unit in farm decision-making, then North Korean collectives must be 
classified as communes, with the smaller units acting as profit centers; 
the exact manner in which decision-making powers are distributed be-
tween the county and the farm are difficult for an outsider to determine. 
Similarly, by the late 1960s in China, the teams (in this case, villages) 
were profit centers with considerable autonomy. If the central communal 
administration had relatively little power, then the Chinese communes 
9 Infield (1945) tells the bizarre story of the 262 cooperative and state farms established 
in the late 1930s in the United States. Zablocki (1980) describes voluntary efforts to estab-
lish cooperative farms in the United States thorough the mid-1970s. 
10 My use of the term commune should not be confused with other meanings of the word; 
e.g., the cooperative farms (found in the USSR in the 1920s and discussed by Wesson 
[1963]) where the members eat or live together, or the village communities of nineteenth-
century Russia, or the small governmental units (without any agricultural functions) in some 
countries such as France or Yugoslavia. These units are not discussed in this study. 
11 I refer to East Germany, North Korea, South Yemen, and the Congo, rather than the 
German Democratic Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the People's Republic of the Congo so as to avoid 
confusion with their capitalist counterparts, which might also be considered democratic, 
albeit in a different sense. 
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should be considered as a network of cooperative farms operating within 
a governmental unit called a commune. Although these kinds of defini-
tional problems raise difficulties of classification, they do not impede 
other aspects of this analysis. 
A Case Study: The USSR 
We can understand these different forms of agriculture organization more 
concretely and, at the same time, gain a clearer idea about some of the 
major themes of this study by examining briefly the experience of the 
Soviet Union. I must stress, however, that the Soviet experience is not 
typical of other Marxist regimes and that the purpose of the many mini-
case studies of countries in this book is to provide flesh for the barebone 
definitions and generalizations. 
Before the major Soviet collectivization drive began in the last two 
months of 1929, individual peasants farmed over 95 percent of the land; 
moreover, the overwhelming majority of these peasants belonged to vil-
lage communities, which controlled economic life of the village (Nove 
1969, p. 106). The government's role in agriculture was primarily as a 
purchaser of grain; and in the mid-1920s it bought roughly three-quarters 
of the marketed grain. As noted in chapter 3, unlike most Marxist re-
gimes, collectivization had not been preceded by a government-di-
rected land reform, although considerable ownership changes had oc-
curred through peasant land takeovers after the revolution. 
Although in chapter 21 discuss in detail the many reasons for collectiv-
ization, three economic reasons appeared most important in the USSR: 
the need to achieve greater production and marketed sales through the 
alleged economies of large-scale farming; the necessity to modernize ag-
riculture; and the desire to force farmers to sell their crops to the govern-
ment at low prices so that the profits could be used to finance industri-
alization. The degrees to which these and other goals of collectivization 
were achieved are analyzed for many Marxist regimes in chapters 7 and 
8. 
The government consolidated private farms into collectivized farms 
with the aid of specially recruited urban workers and party officials. 
Within several months more than half of the peasant population had 
joined the collectives. The administrative excesses committed to achieve 
these results were so extreme that in March 1930 Stalin, who initiated 
this "voluntary" drive, attempted to deflect criticism by placing most of 
the blame on the zeal of local officials. Other Marxist regimes that collec-
tivized later learned a great deal from these policy lessons (see chapter 
4). Subsequently, more than half of the collective farms disbanded, but 
the offensive resumed and in 1934 more than three-quarters of all peas-
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ant households and crop areas were collectivized and organized into 
farms averaging roughly seventy households and four hundred hectares. 
Few of these collective farms were genuine producer cooperatives— 
many were pseudo-cooperatives directed by cadre selected by the party 
or government and most of the remainder were nominal-cooperatives 
formed by farmers wishing to avoid outside interference in their activi-
ties. Over time, however, most of the nominal cooperatives were trans-
formed into pseudo-cooperatives. Autonomous and genuine producer co-
operatives were not a feature of Soviet agriculture. 
In the mid-1920s Stalin had stressed the formation of large state farms, 
but the difficulties inherent in this policy rapidly became apparent. As a 
result, in the collectivization drive, the government placed most stress 
on the formation of collective farms. In 1934, for instance, state farms 
covered less than 10 percent of total crop area. They were somewhat 
larger than the collective farms and averaged about 430 workers and 
2,400 hectares (USSR, Central Statistical Board 1969, p. 127). 
The state farms received detailed output, input, and investment plans; 
furthermore, if costs could not be met, they received subsidies or loans. 
They were less autonomous than collective farms, which received deliv-
ery and input quotas of a less detailed nature, but which could not rely 
on subsidies. In the early years farm officials carried out considerable 
experimentation on organizing and administering these collective and 
state farms, a topic receiving greater attention in chapter 5. 
After the Second World War the government began to consolidate col-
lective farms into much larger units and, in addition, to transform many 
into state farms. After the death of Stalin in 1953, these trends acceler-
ated so that by the late 1980s state farms comprised more than twice the 
land of the collective farms (see table 5.1). Furthermore, the government 
dissolved the MTSs and partly sold, partly gave away their equipment to 
the collective farms. Collective farmers, moreover, began to receive a 
minimum wage and, although producer prices paid to these farms were 
increased several-fold, subsidies to these farms increased dramatically, as 
did their unpaid debts, which were periodically cancelled. In brief, the 
differences between the collective and state farms began to disappear, a 
trend apparent in other Marxist regimes as well. 
In the late 1980s the Gorbachev government took the first tentative 
moves toward decollectivization; that is, the conversion of state and col-
lective farms into either private (corporate or individual) farms, or tenant 
farms with long-term leases, or genuine producer cooperatives. In the 
USSR these policy steps were taken mainly in the form of leasehold con-
tracts to households and, in certain republics such as Georgia, the break-
ing up of highly unprofitable collective and state farms into individual 
farms. As indicated in chapters 10 and 11, by the end of 1990 this decol-
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lectivization movement was still in its initial stages, in contrast with a 
number of other nations under discussion in this book. 
The aims of collectivization and the organization of agriculture that re-
sulted had a considerable impact both on the functioning of the farms (see 
chapters 5 and 6) and on the policies pursued by the government to en-
courage production (see chapter 7). These elements, in turn, greatly in-
fluenced the performance of the agricultural sector (see chapter 8). Fur-
ther consideration of these implications of the organizational forms, 
however, would put us far ahead of our story. 
The Institutional Mix 
As I discuss in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4, the institutions of so-
cialist agriculture are by no means uniform among Marxist regimes. Only 
a few Marxist regimes have communes, and the mix between private, 
cooperative, and state farms varies considerably. To provide an overview, 
four clusters of countries can be distinguished in the 1980s: (1) Some 
Marxist regimes did not have a very large socialist agricultural sector. In 
some cases, for example, the majority of African Marxist regimes, as well 
as Grenada, Poland, and Yugoslavia, this was because not much collectiv-
ization was carried out. In other cases such as China, Kampuchea, Laos, 
or Viet Nam in the late 1980s, this was because these nations carried out 
some type of decollectivization; (2) In other Marxist regimes, mostly in 
East Europe, the agricultural sector was dominated by collective farms; 
(3) In still other Marxist nations, most notably Bulgaria (in the mid-
1980s), Cuba, Guyana, Sao Tome, and the USSR, state farms predomi-
nated; and (4) In a final group including China (in the 1970s) and Mon-
golia (in the 1970s and 1980s) the agricultural sector was dominated by 
communes with the subunits run as pseudo-cooperatives. An important 
question explored in chapter 3 is why particular nations have adopted 
one or another form of socialist agriculture. 
MARXIST REGIMES 
The purpose of this brief discussion is to select the sample for analysis, 
not to condemn or praise certain nations. I choose my particular defini-
tion for analytical convenience to examine particular questions; for other 
types of comparative studies, a much different definition of "Marxist re-
gime" may be more suitable. In particular, I am interested in the impact 
and implementation of Marxist ideas and have shaped my definition ac-
cordingly. 
Since Marx wrote little about the operation of socialist economies or 
agriculture, some readers may be uncomfortable with my terminology 
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and wish to label the countries in my sample as "Marxist-Leninist" or 
"socialist" or "communist." Each of these labels also raises problems, es-
pecially for developing nations whose governments have embraced Marx-
ist ideas and ideals, but which have neither a Leninist-type political party 
nor the resources to implement the type of welfare and other programs 
associated with socialism. 
The Approach of This Study 
The classical definition of socialism refers to ownership of the means of 
production. Table 1.1 provides a rough measure of the importance of gov-
ernmental ownership. A brief glance at the table reveals that this share 
varies enormously among the countries, in part because some nations 
have started along this path at an earlier date and in part because various 
governments have forced the pace of nationalization at different speeds. 
The pattern of nationalization is quite distinct (a matter discussed for East 
Europe in Pryor 1973, chapter 2). For our purposes it is necessary to note 
only that the degree of nationalization in agriculture is generally much 
lower in most other sectors; the exceptions, such as Sao Tome and Sey-
chelles, have arisen from very particular historical circumstances. It 
should also be mentioned that certain non-Marxist socialist countries 
have a much higher percentage of workers in the state and cooperative 
sector (59.8 percent in Algeria in the early 1980s, according to Algeria 
1981, p. 59) than most of the countries in this table. 
As I have argued at length elsewhere (Pryor 1986, chap. 8), distin-
guishing Marxist regimes by ownership or by other economic criteria 
such as the relative share of governmental expenditures in the gross do-
mestic product (GDP), or replacement of market mechanisms of alloca-
tion by governmental central planning and economic administration, is 
not very useful since most Third World nations calling themselves Marx-
ist and attempting to achieve a socialist economy would be excluded from 
this list. For the same reason distinguishing Marxist regimes by the de-
gree to which they are pursuing general socialist development policies 
such as increasing social equality and participation in national decision-
making, development of idealistic individuals unfettered by acquisitive 
motives, or reduction of alienation also does not seem helpful. 
A more fruitful approach in selecting a sample of Marxist regimes em-
ploys both ideological and implementation criteria. A necessary but not 
sufficient ideological condition is whether the leading officials in the gov-
ernment have been strongly influenced by Marxist ideas; that is, if a com-
munist party controls the government or if the elite in power has been 
strongly influenced by some version of Marxism. In some Third World 
countries such as Guinea-Bissau or Sao Tome, an official declaration of 
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Source: See Statistical Note A. For Zimbabwe and South Yemen, the percentage of production is used; 
for Poland, the state sector outside agriculture includes the small number of cooperatives. For several 
other countries the calculations are very approximate, so "other sectors" cannot be easily estimated. 
Notes: AFF = agriculture, forestry, and fishing. 
The percentages represent the share of the economically active population who are working in enter­
prises owned either by some level of government or cooperatively. In cases of mixed ownership, the 
practices of the statistical agencies of each nation are used, since sufficient data to adjust for complete 
comparability are not available. 
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this adherence has not been made, but it is clear from other evidence 
that Marxist ideas have played a crucial and open role in intellectual life 
of the ruling party. The strength of the commitment is important, be-
cause some political leaders such as Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central 
African Republic have, at one time or another, proclaimed their country 
to be Marxist or to be "following" scientific socialism primarily to obtain 
foreign aid from the Soviet Union. 
Ideally we should supplement self-identification with a checklist of 
specific beliefs; for example, in the existence of a vanguard party serving 
as the leading political/economic force in the nation, in the importance of 
the class struggle in forging a socialist nation, in scientific socialism tran-
scending all local characteristics of the society, and so forth. But in many 
cases it is difficult to determine the official party line on these matters or, 
when these phrases are used, to ascertain what they really mean or the 
strength of belief in these doctrines. Thus these more sophisticated ideo-
logical criteria cannot easily be employed. 
Self-identification, of course, has its own difficulties and its use raises 
the problem of the audience and purpose for such symbolic declarations. 
For tactical purposes, the party or governing elites in some countries 
have not openly announced the influence of Marxist ideas on their poli-
cies. The self-identification criterion must be modified to include three 
other cases: (a) Particular governments such as the People's Revolution-
ary Government (PRG) of Grenada, which readily acknowledged the in-
fluence of Marxism in its closed councils (Pryor 1986), but for political 
reasons did not make this announcement publicly; (b) Other govern-
ments such as Cape Verde were dominated by parties founded by those 
who were Marxist, but they did not choose to identify themselves in this 
manner in public and we have no information about their self identifica-
tion behind closed doors. Without evidence to the contrary, we must 
infer that they are Marxist parties; (c) Some other governments, whose 
self-identification and founding ideologies are vague, must be included 
because they have adopted as principal policy measures a set of eco-
nomic, political, and social policies similar to those followed in openly 
declared Marxist regimes; for instance, the Seychelles government has 
announced its intention to eliminate the private ownership of the means 
of production in order to eliminate exploitation (Reno 1982, p. 30). 
An important implementation condition is that the government must 
have sufficient political power to effect crucial structural changes in the 
economy in a socialist direction. In some cases such as the Comoro Is-
lands (the Soilih government), the government did not last long enough 
to effect these changes. In other countries such as San Marino, the self-
proclaimed Communist Party dominated the ruling coalition for some 
years, but was unable to carry out significant structural reforms. Simi-
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larly, in countries such as Surinam (under Desi Bouterse), Ghana (under 
Jerry Rawlings), or Chile (under Salvadore Allende), the leading political 
leaders may have had Marxist sympathies or have been allied politically 
with Marxists, but they were also unable to institute key structural 
changes in the economy. 
This implementation criterion does not mean that the Marxist party 
has achieved a "revolutionary breakthrough"—that is, a decisive change 
in the society—but that it has at least been able to implement a sufficient 
number of Marxist policies to reveal the orientation of the government. 
This is because I wish to include in the sample those regimes that have 
attempted but failed to put major Marxist agricultural organizational 
ideas into practice in order to be better able to isolate those factors per-
mitting these structural changes to be realized. 
My criteria, of course, are difficult to apply because of problems in 
deciding whether the political beliefs of the dominant party should be 
considered as Marxist or as some other brand of socialism; for example, 
African socialism. In addition, the difference between populism and 
Marxism is often difficult to distinguish (Keller 1987). In two cases (Guy-
ana and Madagascar), the government has proclaimed the strong influ-
ence of Marxism on its program, but the Communist Party recognized by 
the Soviet and other communist parties is not the ruling party. I follow 
my own criteria and consider these countries as Marxist regimes. 
Difficulties of classification also appear concerning countries in which 
a significant Thermidorean reaction has occurred; that is, where the gov-
ernment or Marxist party has lost its ideological fervor but nevertheless 
maintains many of the institutions and policies arising when Marxist ide-
ology played a more active role. I have, for instance, included Somalia 
but excluded Mali since the latter country has maintained fewer of the 
"socialist institutions." A final problem of classification arises because 
Marxist-Leninist ideas may no longer be determinant in implementing 
(in contrast to making) policy. For instance, Mathieu Kerekou, the Pres-
ident of Benin, had a useful insight when he complained in 1981 that "the 
government and revolutionary structures no longer exist in reality, for 
the bureaucrats have virtually seized power on the government's back" 
(Decalo 1987, p. 11). Although this may have been merely an excuse for 
his own failures of leadership, there may have been an important ele-
ment of truth to the statement as well. 
Others have treated such borderline cases differently from me because 
they have examined different issues from those associated with the orga-
nization of agriculture, which serves as the focus of this book. Research 
Note A includes a further discussion of these issues and, in addition, 
presents three other lists of Marxist nations. My own list has thirty-three 
countries, of which twenty-six are found in all of the other three lists. At 
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least one authority disputes my inclusion of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Somalia, and Zimbabwe, and another 
disputes my exclusion of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Ghana, 
Guinea, Mali, Surinam, Syria, Tanzania, and Zambia. These eighteen 
nations of contention must be considered borderline cases. 
To digress for a moment, the difficulties in identifying Marxist regimes 
impede the development of a theory explaining why certain govern-
ments, but not others, have become Marxist regimes. Although this 
question is best left to political scientists and historians, we can answer a 
simpler but related question of how the process proceeded.12 Nine of the 
nations became Marxist regimes as a result of decisive military interfer-
ence by another Marxist nation; eleven, as a consequence of an extensive 
civil war, either against the existing government or an occupying power; 
an additional eleven, as the result of a coup or a revolution from above; 
and two, as the outcome of an election. Of the twenty-four countries that 
became Marxist without decisive outside interference only one can be 
considered industrialized (Czechoslovakia) and only one other (Czarist 
Russia), as semi-industrialized. Fifteen of these nations were also colo-
nies within the last two decades of becoming Marxist regimes, and an-
other five had experienced wars against foreign invaders. Thus the ques-
tion of why one political-economic system was chosen can be narrowed 
to the problem of determining the distinguishing characteristics of those 
poor nations, often recently decolonized or ravaged by war, that are dis-
cussed in this study with a similar group of nations that did not become 
Marxist regimes. 
This exercise of determining the path to power provides some inter-
esting clues to how the various governments have functioned. As I show 
in later chapters, however, it tells us little about how agriculture has 
been organized or, for that matter, which nations have decollectivized. 
Finally, this study focuses primarily on the forty-year period from 1950 
to 1990. Any study dealing with Marxist regimes only in the 1990s would 
undoubtedly omit a number of countries in my list. For instance, from 
1989 through January 1991, the citizens of some of the countries of my 
sample voted out Marxist governments (Cape Verde, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Hungary, Nicaragua, and Poland). In others the Marxist 
regimes disappeared, either as a result of a coup or invasion (Grenada, 
12 Nations with decisive interference by another Marxist regime include: Bulgaria, East 
Germany, Hungary, Laos, Kampuchea, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, and Romania. 
Nations with extensive civil war include: Albania, Angola, China, Cuba, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Yemen, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe. Nations 
with coups or revolutions from above include: Afghanistan, Benin, Congo, Czechoslovakia, 
Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia, and the Soviet Union. 
Nations with elected Marxist parties include Cape Verde and Sao Tome. Among the 24 
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Somalia) or merger with a non-Marxist regime (South Yemen). In still 
other nations the top government leaders have either renounced Marx-
ism-Leninism (e.g., Benin), distanced themselves from these doctrines 
(e.g., Angola, Mozambique), declared that for their economy Marxism-
Leninism has failed (e.g., Ethiopia), or reached a state of ideological ex-
haustion (Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Madagascar, Sao Tome, and parts of 
Yugoslavia). In a final group of nations the Thermidor will perhaps have 
proceeded sufficiently far by the mid-1990s so that the label "Marxist 
regime" would no longer aid analysis. Although prediction is risky, these 
countries might include Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Congo, Kampu-
chea, Laos, and Mongolia. Under certain conditions, as I discuss briefly 
in chapter 11, it is also possible that some other countries not on my list 
may become Marxist regimes or that certain countries such as Nicaragua 
might vote back into power revitalized Marxist parties, especially if the 
non-Marxist governments prove incapable of dealing successfully with 
the nation's economic problems. Marxism-Leninism may be ill in the 
early 1990s, but it is far from dead. 
Since this book is a study of the impact of Marxist ideas on the orga-
nization of agriculture, it is not vitally important to determine whether I 
have included all Marxist regimes in the analysis or whether my sample 
includes some regimes that others consider as non-Marxist. What is crit-
ical is that the sample includes a wide enough range of governments in 
which Marxism has had a crucial influence on agricultural policy so that 
many national experiences are taken into account. 
It is not my intention in this book to march the reader through thirty-
three case studies, but rather to use these cases to illuminate a series of 
general propositions about agricultural organization in Marxist regimes. 
I present much of the important information about specific countries in 
tabular form for reference purposes. Thus sufficient data are available for 
readers who wish to omit some countries from the analysis and to recal-
culate my statistical results. 
FORCES UNDERLYING THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE 
In various Marxist regimes agriculture has played different economic 
roles—as a source of food for the urban areas, as a source of exports, as a 
source of labor for urban industrial growth, and as a source of finance for 
urban investment. These roles have differed according to the level of eco-
nations that had become Marxist regimes without decisive outside interference, the follow-
ing were recent colonies: Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sao Tomo, Seychelles, Somalia, Viet Nam, South 
Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The following had also experienced recent wars against foreign 
aggressors: Albania, China, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. 
This content downloaded from 130.58.34.221 on Wed, 14 Jul 2021 13:46:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
24 CHAPTER 1 
nomic development and the available land area, the share of the labor 
force in agriculture, what foodstuffs are produced, the importance of ex-
ports, and other key economic factors. The level of economic develop-
ment also influences the government's ability to administer a collectiv-
ized agricultural sector in a centralized fashion and, as I indicate in 
chapters 10 and 11, to carry out a successful decollectivization. The eco-
nomic size of the nation is important because of the relatively greater 
economic role of foreign trade in small countries and, I should add with 
regard to Third World nations, the particularly strategic nature of agri-
cultural exports. Because several of the countries discussed in this study 
may be unfamiliar to some readers, it is useful to present several tables 
that summarize these causal factors in a systematic fashion. 
Population, Level of Development, and Land Area 
The nations discussed in this study cover a wide range of economic con-
ditions. Table 1.2 shows some key economic variables and table 1.3 sum-
marizes these data from a worldwide perspective. For this exercise it is 
instructive to divide the Marxist regimes into three groups—core coun-
tries of the Socialist Commonwealth, other core countries, and periph-
ery, depending upon their political and economic closeness to the Soviet 
Union. This type of division provides insight since the three groups have 
very different economic characteristics and illustrates the heterogeneity 
of the sample under analysis. 
Those core countries classified as belonging to the Socialist Common-
wealth have a relatively high per capita income and also a much lower 
population density (more arable land per capita) than the world average. 
The other core countries (the numbers are dominated by China) have 
relatively lower per capita incomes, a much smaller share of the gross 
world product, and considerably higher population density than the 
world average. The peripheral nations have a still lower per capita in-
come and a smaller share of the gross world product, but have a popula-
tion density roughly equal to the world average. 
The Importance of Agriculture 
Table 1.4 presents several key indicators of the relative importance of 
agriculture in the economies of the sample nations. Again, the major 
message is the heterogeneity of the sample. In later chapters I refer to 
specific aspects of the data. 
The share of the labor force in agriculture gives the simplest picture of 
its relative weight in the economy: this sector employs three-fifths or 
more of the labor force in most of the African and Asian Marxist regimes 
This content downloaded from 130.58.34.221 on Wed, 14 Jul 2021 13:46:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
AN OVERVIEW 25 
in the economy, but in the Marxist regimes in the Americas and Europe 
this share is much lower.13 
The value added in agriculture as a percentage of factor price GDP 
gives another type of measure of the relative importance of agriculture. 
Dividing this series with data on the share of the labor force in agricul­
ture allows us to compute the relative GDP per economically active in 
the two sectors which, in turn, provides a comparison of the relative 
productivities and/or compensation of labor of agricultural and nonagri-
cultural sectors. In the third data column, I designate as "relatively back­
ward" (RB) those agricultural sectors whose relative GDP per worker is 
less than one-fourth that of the nonagricultural sectors in the same na­
tion. This measure not only indicates those countries where some type of 
agricultural reorganization is most necessary, but also where such reor­
ganization is most difficult. It is noteworthy that these relatively back­
ward agricultural sectors occur primarily in countries in Africa and Asia. 
Although Cuba appears an exception, problems with the data in this 
country may appear because of some anomalies in the pricing of agricul­
tural and nonagricultural products. 
The last four columns present some indicators of the role of agriculture 
in foreign trade. This is important for a later discussion of how, in these 
countries, an overvalued exchange rate has worked to the particular det­
riment of agriculture, and an examination of a useful proposition by Col-
burn (1986) that the private sector in agriculture has a particularly strong 
bargaining position in those countries where agricultural exports or im­
ports are important. Of the twenty-four countries for which data are 
available, trade in agricultural goods is relatively unimportant in only five 
nations (this class is designated as O in the table), most of which are in 
East Europe. At the other extreme, agricultural exports play an ex­
tremely important role in total exports of nine nations (Βέηίη, Cuba, 
Ethiopia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Sao Tome, 
and Somalia; this class is designated XX in the table). It is noteworthy 
that in six of these nine countries, agricultural products play a key role in 
imports (Cuba, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua are the exceptions), which 
means not only that their agricultural sectors are relatively specialized 
1 3 For Cape Verde, Mongolia, Seychelles, and South Yemen natural conditions are not 
very suitable for agriculture, and this may also be the case for North Korea, which is moun­
tainous. I am puzzled, however, by the inclusion of Sao Ύοταέ in this list, since it is a very 
poor nation specializing in agricultural exports. Moreover, this nation has a relatively low 
degree of urbanization (only 15.6 percent of the population lived in urban areas larger than 
two thousand people). The census data for 1981 do not suggest that agricultural workers are 
classified in related industries: the share of the economically active engaged in forestry and 
fishing is 4.8 percent and in agro-industries, 1.2 percent. The degree to which the Sao 
Tome data are comparable to those of the other nations is unknown. 
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Some Key Economic Variables of Marxist Regimes, 1980 
Population 
(1000s) 




















































































































































Notes on GDP 
Very rough estimate. 
Very rough estimate. 
Very rough estimate. 
Very rough estimate. 
Very rough estimate. 
Very rough estimate. 
See note below. 
Very rough estimate. 
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Source: The population data come from United Nations (1988a, table 3), the land data come from Food 
and Agricultural Organization (data files), and most GDP data come from Robert Summers and Alan 
Heston (1988). 
Notes: Summers and Heston (1988) estimate the per capita GDP of China as 264 percent that of India; 
the World Bank (annual, 1982, p. 110) estimates the same statistic as 121 percent that of India. I have 
taken an unweighted average as my estimate. The estimates designated as "very rough" represent little 
more than educated guesses on my part. 
T A B L E 1.3 
Summary of Key Economic Parameters of Marxist Regimes 
Groups of Nations 
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Total 





































Source: See Table 1.2. 
Notes: To calculate these percentages for the GDP, I had to make rough estimates for 
nations not included in the calculations by Summers and Heston (1988). 
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but also that they face more risks on the world market because of their 
lack of self-sufficiency in food. Later chapters discuss the role of these 
factors in a more rigorous and thorough fashion. 
PLAN OF ATTACK 
For the most part I have based this study on the primary and secondary 
literature of the thirty-three nations under review, supplemented by un-
published reports of international organizations. For some chapters, par-
ticularly those dealing with the most recent agricultural reforms, I have 
also used materials gathered from interviews of experts and government 
officials both inside and outside of the nations, as well as from discussions 
with farm directors and workers in eight of the nations under review. 
Any broad study of the economic organization of agriculture in Marxist 
regimes must deal with five major topics: the important ideological views 
about the sector; the origin and development of the major forms of pro-
ductive units; the internal organization of the farms and their external 
links with related sectors; major governmental agricultural policies and 
their results; and the changes in the organizational structure in recent 
years. These topics guide the analysis in the following chapters. 
The next chapter, which forms the second segment of this introduc-
tion, focuses on both the general Marxist doctrines on agriculture and 
the policy issues leading to collectivization. Although classical Marxist 
writers wrote extensively about agriculture, they included little discus-
sion about collectivization or the organization of agriculture in the tran-
sition to communism. This raises a number of questions: To what extent 
are the parallels drawn by Marx between the paths of economic devel-
opment in agriculture and industry persuasive? To what degree have 
Marxian predictions about developments in agriculture been validated in 
leading capitalist nations over the last century? If, as I argue, only partial 
responsibility for agricultural collectivization can be laid at the doorstep 
of Marx, what were the other crucial elements in this decision in the 
Soviet Union? If many of the specific policy problems leading to Soviet 
collectivization were specific to that country, why did most other Marxist 
regimes also collectivize? To answer these and similar questions, it is es-
sential to separate Marxist propositions, attitudes, and examples and to 
provide some notion of the range of policies receiving justification from 
the same doctrinal source. 
Land Reforms and Collectivization 
This part deals with the painful processes of creating a socialist agricul-
tural sector. Most, but not all Marxist regimes have carried out land re-
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forms, but the specific measures of these reforms have been quite differ-
ent. The most important causal mechanisms for these differences receive 
considerable attention and give rise to a number of questions: How can 
the different types of land reform measures be explained? Why have cer-
tain Marxist nations collectivized and others not? What are the key rela-
tionships between the land reform and collectivization processes? Why 
have different countries focused either on state farms or collective farms? 
And why have various Marxist regimes taken very different strategies to 
achieve full collectivization? The comparative analyses in chapters 3 and 
4 provide useful clues for the answers to these questions. 
Structural Elements 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus attention on both external and internal organiza-
tional issues. The former refers to horizontal and vertical integration of 
the farms; that is, the size of the farms and the manner in which they 
obtain inputs and sell their outputs. The latter refers to the way in which 
the state and collective farms organize their productive activities and 
compensate their labor force. From the descriptive materials a number 
of questions arise: Why have collective and state farms continued to grow 
in size over the years? How do the various ways for resolving problems of 
external organization influence the performance of the agricultural sector 
or the ease with which decollectivization can occur? What are the com-
petitive and complementary elements between the socialist agricultural 
sector and the individual plots that are allowed farmers on collective 
farms? What are the options facing collective and state farm managers in 
organizing production and how does this choice effect performance or the 
speed of organizational change? The analysis yields insights into these 
questions and is supplemented by a research note presenting a model of 
decision-making by collective and state farm directors in a centrally 
planned economy in order to show in a rigorous fashion why it is likely 
that the dynamic efficiency of these farms is lower than in market econ-
omies. 
Policy and Performance 
The performance of agriculture is influenced not just by the organiza-
tional structure, but also by governmental policies. Chapter 7 deals with 
policies issues and three critical questions about them: Although policies 
vary a great deal from one country to another, depending upon the spe-
cific agricultural conditions, what are the elements common to all? To 
what extent are these policies distinctly influenced by Marxist doctrines? 
And to what extent are such policies tied to the organizational structure 
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of agriculture? In chapter 8 I examine what the major differences are in 
agricultural performance between Marxist and non-Marxist nations. This 
quantitative exercise requires a separation of the respective influences of 
Marxist ideology in general, central economic planning of agriculture, 
and collectivization. I place particular emphasis on dynamic, rather than 
static, criteria of evaluation and show that the lower growth of total factor 
productivity is the major distinguishing characteristic of Marxist agricul-
ture. This conclusion parallels Murrell's (1989) empirical analysis of 
Marxist foreign trade showing that these nations have a lower generation 
and adoption of technological and organizational innovation than compa-
rable nations in the West. 
Reforms and the Future 
In chapter 9 I examine the question of decollectivization from the view-
point of the farmer and try to review those factors that increase the diffi-
culty of the process. For instance, decollectivization is more likely to oc-
cur in Marxist regimes with agricultural sectors employing a relatively 
simple technology than in those nations which have a relatively mecha-
nized agriculture and in those countries where property rights can be 
enforced. In the next two chapters I analyze problems of the reform of 
the organization of agriculture from the viewpoint of the government. In 
chapter 10 I investigate the different types of agricultural reforms taking 
place in the various Marxist regimes at the beginning of the 1990s and 
explore the major problems arising in changing the property relations, of 
marketizing the agricultural sector, and of changing farm management 
practices. A research note covers in greater detail the agricultural re-
forms in China, Guyana, Hungary, and the USSR. Chapter 11 provides 
an analysis of some macroeconomic issues, including the phasing of eco-
nomic and political reforms and the timing of particular economic 
changes that play a major role in the success of agricultural reforms. The 
book ends with some reflections on the rise and possible fall of collectiv-
ized agriculture. 
The furrow plowed in this book is long and difficult, and at this point 
the fruitfulness of the harvest is far from certain. Much more can be said 
about what should be done and how it should be accomplished, but since 
the major goals of the analysis should be clear, this prologue should end. 
Now it is time to roll up our sleeves and begin. 
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